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Abstract
Over the last few months, the situation in Ukraine has taken a frightening turn for
the worst. What started out as a spontaneous popular protest in Kiev in November
2013 has evolved into a full-blown international crisis, pitting Russia against
Ukraine, Russia against the West and Ukraine against itself. A lot of time is spent,
on the airwaves or on the internet, in trying to understand the how and why of this
sudden and largely unexpected conflict. Even more time is spent pointing a finger
and hoping to find the culprit for the eruption of violence. Unsurprisingly, most
of the criticism by the international community is directed towards Russia who
invaded a sovereign country under dubious pretexts then proceeded to annex a
chunk of it while maintaining military pressure to try and bully it into accepting
its arbitrage.
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observers agree. Indeed, the political situation in Kiev 
during the last days of February is murky. Yanukovych’s 
destitution did not precisely follow constitutional 
guidelines while the inclusion of far-right Svoboda party 
members in the new Ukrainian government is certainly 
cause for concern. However, this should not lead us to 
reject the Ukrainian authorities’ legitimacy as a whole.
As a matter of fact, the Council of Europe has recently 
taken a stand on this very issue in a recent report, 
convincingly demonstrating that, even though 
president Yanukovych’s destitution did not follow the 
law to the letter, it followed it in spirit. As the report 
states, the legitimacy of the new Ukrainian authorities 
has been widely recognized by the international 
community. Further, the decision to strip Yanukovitch 
of his presidential title and to return to the 2004 
constitution was made by 2/3 majority of Ukraine’s 
Parliament. The parliamentarians who voted (including 
many from Yanukovych’s own Party of Regions) were 
democratically elected in 2012 and their legitimacy 
cannot be questioned. They are the constitutional 
representatives of the Ukrainian people and, as 
such, have taken it upon themselves to constitute a 
new government after impeaching former president 
Yanukovitch. This decision did not truly respect the 
constitution to the letter but, until the presidential 
elections set for May 25, there is no doubt about its 
legitimacy, moral and popular.
Moreover, following Moscow’s logic, if the authorities 
in Kiev have a shaky legal standing at the moment, the 
government in Crimea is itself illegal and illegitimate. On 
February 27, “armed gunmen” stormed and occupied 
the Crimean Parliament before the MPs voted to sack 
the regional cabinet and to hold a referendum on 
May 25. They also appointed a new chairman: Sergei 
Aksyonov who was elected to the regional parliament 
with only 4% of the votes in 2010. His already feeble 
democratic legitimacy is thus even further weakened 
by the means in which he was appointed.
Another frequent claim made by the Russian 
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But, according to Moscow, the annexation of Crimea 
and the proposed federalisation of Ukraine are 
completely logical, legal and legitimate. Russian 
officials and the Russia media are united in trying 
to convince the world of the legitimacy of Russian 
actions. By distorting the facts and misrepresenting 
the situation on the ground, we are presented with a 
picture of the crisis that is hard to accept. Nonetheless, 
Russian actions are taken for granted, in Russia and 
even abroad, so it is important to set things straight 
for posterity’s sake. Below are a few of Russia’s 
assertions, decrypted and debunked.
1. “The authorities in Kiev are illegitimate 
neo-Nazis”
In the words of Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, 
“Ukraine’s new government is not legitimate”. This is 
the main argument underpinning Russia’s intervention 
in Ukraine. They argue that ousted president Viktor 
Yanukovych remains Ukraine’s legitimate president 
and that the crisis was sparked by an illegal coup of 
pro-European – and anti-Russian – fascists and neo-
Nazis. Like the rest of Moscow’s discourse, this view 
cannot be completely dismissed, as a lot of outside 
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authorities is that the Ukrainian interim government 
must not be recognized as it is full of Nazis and fascists, 
citing the role of the very distasteful Svoboda party 
and frankly repugnant Praviy Sektor group. Vladimir 
Putin himself, in his March 18th speech criticized the 
Ukrainian government’s establishment: “Nationalists, 
neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites executed 
this coup. They continue to set the tone in Ukraine 
to this day”. This move to dismiss Kiev’s legitimacy 
and instil a climate of fear is unconvincing as the 
importance of Svoboda in the government is not to 
be overestimated. In all, only three ministers of the 21 
member cabinet stem from Svoboda (down from four, 
after Ihor Tenyukh resignation as Minister of Defence). 
Some would say that is already three too many but it 
is still not enough to dismiss the entire government as 
altogether illegitimate. 
What’s more, Moscow is quick to denounce supporters 
of Ukraine’s sovereignty as fascists but does not 
hesitate to welcome far-right extremists as long as 
they agree with Russia’s own version of the facts. A 
few days ago, Marine Le Pen, leader of the French far-
right Front National had an extensive discussion with 
the President of the Russian Duma, faithfully echoing 
the Russian line of events and endorsing its proposed 
federalising solution as if it were her own. Incidentally, 
in 2009, it was Marine Le Pen’s turn to act as a 
hostess when the Front National and Svoboda signed 
a collaboration agreement, finding a lot of common 
ideological ground. In the current crisis, unsavoury 
political elements abound on all sides of this conflict 
but Moscow is wrong in thinking it has the moral high 
ground.
2. “Crimea is Kosovo”
A regular argument used by Russia to justify its – (c)overt 
– intervention in Crimea and further annexation, is that 
Crimea is just like Kosovo. The countries of the West 
are thus all hypocrites for having recognized Kosovo’s 
independence but refusing to do the same for Crimea, 
even though the circumstances are supposedly similar. 
An ethnic majority in a marginal region of a State bent 
on its destruction: the moral imperative to act and stop 
threats to the well-being of a terrorized population 
is evident. However, this Kosovo comparison poses 
two problems. First, Russia has consistently denied 
Kosovo’s right to be independent, claiming that its 
secession from Serbia, aided by NATO and the West, 
was and is illegal. But this does not prevent Moscow 
from using that argument in justifying Crimea’s 
temporary independence. This is absurd; a purportedly 
illegitimate case cannot be used as a basis to legitimise 
another. Either Kosovo and Crimea are both legitimate 
or they are both illegitimate, but you can’t use the 
Kosovo argument if you refuse it in the first place.
The second problem with the Kosovo precedent is 
that, contrary to Russian claims, the circumstances 
of the crisis in Kosovo and Crimea are completely 
different. As David Phillips of Columbia University 
writes, “there are fundamental legal and political 
differences between the internationally sanctioned 
process, which culminated in Kosovo’s independence 
and Russia’s land-grab in Crimea”. In 1999, NATO 
intervened in Kosovo only after a slaughter of Kosovar 
Albanians was well underway. The ensuing declaration 
of independence came 9 years later, after a long and 
careful diplomatic process to try out all the alternative 
solutions. In contrast, there was no violence in Crimea, 
no threat to the Russian population living there, and the 
events unfolded surprisingly fast. In less than a month, 
Crimea – which had known no recent tensions – was 
occupied, declared independence, held a referendum 
and was annexed by Russia. Even Putin admits there 
was no violence in Crimea, claiming however that 
Russian action was necessary because there would 
have been violence if nothing was done. Unfortunately, 
baseless predictions are very poor arguments for a 
legitimate reaction. Even if the Kremlin is hosting a 
couple of Minority Report style precogs which can 
accurately predict future events, this is not enough to 
act on international matters. 
3. “The people of Crimea have spoken”
Even if we discount Crimea’s shaky moral claim to 
statehood, Russia argues that the March 16 referendum 
was legal, legitimate and completely justified. In the 
West too, most observers don’t oppose the substance 
of the referendum but prefer to criticize the method. 
If Crimea’s inhabitants were determined to join Russia, 
there were actually legal and constitutional means to 
do so. However, in the circumstances, the referendum 
should not be seen as valid because even if it accurately 
expressed the will of the people (which has yet to be 
seen), the method used sheds doubts on the entire 
process. 
As noted before, the Crimean parliament voted to hold 
the referendum right after armed gunmen stormed 
the building. The vote was thus held under military 
duress. This was only a preview as the referendum 
as a whole was held under a military occupation. 
On the day that Crimea’s inhabitants were called to 
determine their region’s future, unidentified – Russian 
– soldiers patrolled the streets. How can a vote be 
called democratic when it is organised under such 
a military occupation? Furthermore, no time was 
given to organise a balanced campaign. The date for 
the referendum, initially planned for the 25th of May 
was advanced twice, being finally held just over two 
weeks after the initial decision. This hurry in itself is 
questionable as nothing justified it. With thousands 
of Russian soldiers in the peninsula, there was no 
chance of Kiev taking over the region, by force of 
otherwise. But the short delay meant that there was 
no opportunity for any democratic process to take 
hold. How can the people make informed decisions 
about their future if there is no time to form their 
opinion? Besides, there was no room left for dissenting 
information anyway, a campaign of propaganda and 
fear mongering was organized to convince people 
that the only way forward lay with Russia, bolstered 
by a media blackout in Russia and Crimea to shut out 
dissenting opinions.
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Moreover, the options on the ballot were extremely 
confusing and one-sided. Two choices were offered: 
the “reunification of Crimea with Russia” or the 
“restoration of the 1992 constitution”. The problem is, 
first of all, that there was no status quo option and, 
second, that no one quite knows what the second 
option means as there were two Crimean constitutions 
in 1992. In one of them, Crimea is declared a sovereign 
State and in the second, a constitutional part of 
Ukraine1. The wording on the ballot left a lot of room 
for manoeuvring and confusion. But in any case, 
the choice wasn’t really important as the Crimean 
Parliament declared independence four days before 
the referendum, leaving the voters with little choice 
but to support the move towards Russia or to abstain. 
No wonder then that 96% of the electorate chose to 
reintegrate Russia. The high scores obtained shed 
some doubts on the results; such a massive plebiscite is 
unheard of in democratic countries. The numbers also 
clash with opinion polls held in February 2014 – before 
the crisis – which showed that 40% of the population of 
Crimea supported the union with Russia. 
4. “Russia is righting a historical wrong”
After the annexation, President Putin addressed 
Russia to explain and justify this action. His entire 
speech presents a biased version of history that 
fails to convince if we take even a cursory glance at 
the evidence. Three points in particular have to be 
redressed: Crimea’s historical “Russianness”, relations 
between Ukraine and Russia, and the NATO problem. 
To start with, Putin states that “Crimea has always 
been an inseparable part of Russia” and that the 1954 
decision to transfer Crimea to Ukraine was illegal. 
Actually, Crimea has not always been a part of Russia, 
far from it. The peninsula was added to the Russian 
empire in 1783 after the annexation of the Crimean 
Khanate which had ruled the region since 1478. Since 
the Khanate’s rule on Crimea is actually longer than 
the Russian reign, should it be governed exclusively by 
the Crimean Tatars? Of course not, because a historical 
precedent does not constitute sufficient cause. If it 
did, Germany could very rightfully claim Kaliningrad – 
or Königsberg as it was called in Prussian – back from 
Russia. The historical argument is invalid because it 
never ends and thus does little to serve as justification. 
Regarding the Soviet decision to transfer Crimea from 
the RSFSR to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, here 
too Vladimir Putin is wrong. The transfer, even if the 
reasons underpinning it seem unfair, was done in 
accordance with Soviet law2. In fact, the 1977 Soviet 
Constitution – which serves as a legal basis for the 
borders and political configuration of the post-Soviet 
space – makes no mention of Crimea being a part of 
Russia. Moscow therefore has no legal claim to Crimea.
Putin further states that Russia has been a friendly 
neighbour to Ukraine, accommodating it on border 
issues in the expectation that it would “remain [a] 
1 Emmanuelle Armandon, La Crimée entre Russie et Ukraine. Un conflit qui 
n’a pas eu lieu, Bruylant, 2012, pp. 86-91.
2 Ibid, pp. 46-51.
good neighbour”. This would then imply that, if and 
when Ukraine starts becoming a “bad neighbour”, 
Russia would feel free to renege on its promises. Again, 
this is a strange way of viewing international relations. 
Diplomatic agreements and border treaties aren’t 
made exclusively between friendly countries. And 
international treaties do not cease to exist just because 
the former partner has a change of government. If this 
happened, Russia herself would be in a precarious 
position as all the treaties signed between the Soviet 
Union and its partners, and inherited by Moscow – 
including its special status in the UN Security Council – 
would be invalid. This same line of thinking is prevalent 
in Sergei Lavrov’s claim that Russia should not be held 
to her promises signed in the Budapest Memorandum 
of 1994 (upholding Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity) as those promises were made to previous 
government. Actually, not only did Russia violate the 
Memorandum, it also violated the UN Charter as well 
as previous bilateral treaties enshrining Ukrainian 
territorial integrity. 
Finally (at least for this commentary), Vladimir Putin, in 
his speech, asserts once again that one of the reasons 
for the crisis is NATO’s broken promise and expansion 
to the East. According to him, Ukraine is on the verge 
of joining the Alliance, prompting him to act. This 
is problematic in two respects. First, the Ukrainian 
authorities – and lead presidential hopeful Petro 
Poroshenko – have repeatedly stated that Ukraine’s 
membership to NATO is not on the agenda. NATO’s 
Secretary General has also reiterated that there are 
no plans for opening the Alliance to Ukraine. Putin’s 
claim is simply false. However, the question of NATO 
seems central in explaining the roots of the current 
crisis. Many Western commentators in particular 
blame Russia’s (re)actions on the fact that NATO was 
creeping dangerously close to the Russian borders 
despite a famous promise made to Gorbachev in 1990 
that the Alliance would not expand eastward after 
Germany’s reunification. While not trying to absolve 
Western leaders of any responsibility in the current 
East-West tensions, it is dangerous to point the finger 
solely at NATO, thereby forgetting that the Crimean 
– and East Ukrainian – crisis was sparked by Russia. 
Moreover, there never was any “pledge” made not 
to expand NATO in 19903. This issue should be put to 
rest. We could argue that NATO enlargement wasn’t a 
wise decision but we can’t forget that the most fervent 
supporters of NATO expansion to the East were the 
Eastern European countries themselves. Immediately 
after the fall of the Soviet Union, they turned to the 
Alliance, asking to be accepted, viewing it as the best 
security guarantee against the perceived threat of 
Russia. Sovereign States joined NATO willingly; this was 
no imposed “sphere of influence”. And, watching the 
situation in Ukraine unfold, these countries are now 
reinforced in their decision. Russia hasn’t done much 
to convince its neighbours that it poses no threat and 
that NATO isn’t necessary anymore, on the contrary, 
it has confirmed those fears. The Baltic States and 
Poland in particular are very worried about the Russian 
3 Mark Kramer, “The Myth of No-NATO-Enlargement Pledge to Russia”, The 
Washington Quarterly, 32:2, April 2009, pp. 39-61.
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leadership’s current policy and have called for more 
NATO involvement in the region as the only protection 
against a resurgent Russia. 
In bad faith
Russian arguments in this crisis share a common 
trait: none of them are true but none of them can be 
dismissed outright. They present a simplistic view of 
reality, asserted in bad faith, but which lacks credibility 
as soon as you start digging. Even so, they all have a 
small kernel of truth that is sufficient to make the world 
hesitate while Russia acts, benefitting from this margin 
of uncertainty to create new facts on the ground. The 
problem isn’t so much with the substance of truth as 
it is with the degree of truth at play. We can see this 
again in Sergey Lavrov’s recent remarks, accusing the 
West of “applying double standards to activists in 
eastern Ukraine protesting against the coup-appointed 
government, forgetting similar protests in the capital’s 
Independence Square”. Very superficially, we could 
indeed compare the Euromaidan protests to the 
demonstrations in the East, seeing both as popular 
opposition to the regime in Kiev, be it Yanukovych’s 
or the interim government’s. But this superficial and 
simplistic view presented by the Russians is cynical at 
best. Yes, on the face of it, both movements seem to 
share the same roots. In reality though, you cannot 
compare the spontaneous popular and peaceful 
protests that started in November 2013 with armed 
separatism waged by organized, armed and masked 
gunmen who seem directly supported by Moscow and 
whose objectives lie with a new Russian annexation. 
Regardless, Moscow’s aims are not to find the truth in 
this matter or even to convince the West of its good 
faith. Rather, these claims are made to make us pause, 
to buy Russia enough time to prevent us from reacting 
efficiently. In this, Russia is quite successful as the 
events in Ukraine have seen Russian tactics triumph in 
the face of Ukrainian panic and Western caution. Will 
these tactical successes lead to a strategic victory and 
a rewriting of history? That is for time to tell.
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